


JPRS-TAC-93-006  
25 March 1993



**FOREIGN  
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# ***JPRS Report***



# **Arms Control**

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# Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-93-006

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**'Progress' in Border Force Reduction Talks With CIS States**

*OW1603031193 Beijing XINHUA in English 0228 GMT  
16 Mar 93*

[Text] Moscow, March 15 (XINHUA)—The building of military confidence among China and four Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members highlighted discussion on the final day of the ninth round of negotiations on border arms reduction. Regarding the issue of reducing arms, there was certain progress.

Attending the round, which began on February 25, were delegations from China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia. China's delegation was composed of military and diplomatic experts.

The round reportedly was carried on in a friendly and realistic atmosphere. Delegates from both sides exchanged views on the contents of certain agreements. The 10th round of talks is scheduled to be held in Beijing.

Andrey Nikolayev, first deputy chief of General Staff for both the Russian Army and Navy, met with members of the Chinese delegation during the talks.

**NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA**

**ISRAEL**

**Exclusion From Regional Group May Impede Signing of CW Convention**

*TA1503123393 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 15 Mar 93 p 1*

[Report by Hemi Shalev]

[Text] Israel has informed the United Kingdom that its noninclusion in any geographical group in the United Nations may impair its ability to comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention, signed several months ago in Paris, and might also influence its readiness to sign the convention prohibiting the proliferation or stockpiling of biological weapons.

Deputy Foreign Minister Yosi Beilin told Douglas Hurd, the British minister for foreign and Commonwealth affairs, that Jerusalem is extremely disappointed with Europe's growing inclination to reject Israel's request to join the geographical group of "Western Europe and Others" (WEO) [acronym published in English] within the UN framework. Ever since the establishment of the State of Israel, the Arab states have prevented it from joining the Asian geographical group, while the EC countries, led by Britain, plan to reject Israel's request to be accepted in the WEO.

The geographical groupings permit the election of different countries to various UN frameworks, such as the Security Council. Beilin told Hurd that Israel's noninclusion in any geographic group prevents it from joining the institutions now being established in Prague by the Chemical Weapons Convention. For the same reason, in the future Israel will not be able to join the organizations now being set up by the treaty on the nonproliferation of biological weapons. Beilin implied that this situation will require Israel's "perusal."

In his talks in London, Beilin managed to secure initial British agreement to cooperate in the field of international aid allocated by Israel through the Foreign Ministry's Department of International Cooperation. It was agreed that Israel and Britain will begin such cooperation, which is already maintained with several countries, including the United States and the Netherlands. The British expressed readiness to cooperate on aid to the CIS, central Africa, and the black leadership in South Africa belonging to the African National Congress.

Beilin also sought British support for Israel's request for "favored status" in its economic relations with Europe, prior to the Council of Europe's decision regarding the "mandate" that will be given to the officials negotiating with Israel on this matter. Israel and the EC are now holding "exploratory talks" prior to the decision on the negotiating mandate, which is expected this summer.

## STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

**Belarusian Parliamentarian on START Implementation***WS1903084093 Minsk RESPUBLIKA in Russian  
23 Feb 93 p 5*

[Interview with Mecheslav Ivanavich Grib, chairman of the Supreme Council Committee for National Security, Defense, and Crime, by newspaper correspondent Rozija Khodzhaeva: "Belarus Is a Nonnuclear State, So It Will Not Become a Nuclear Target"; place and date not given—first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] According to our previous reports, the Supreme Council at a closed plenary session ratified the international agreements on nuclear topics: on the reduction and limitation of the strategic offensive arms (START I); the so-called 1992 Lisbon protocol on weapon types, which was signed by four nuclear states—Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan; the agreement between Belarus and Russia on the coordination of action in the military sphere, and the agreement on the Strategic Forces temporarily stationed on Belarusian territory. All these agreements came into force on 4 February, 1993.

Mecheslav Ivanavich Grib, chairman of the Supreme Council Committee for National Security, Defense, and Crime, comments on these agreements in his interview with our correspondent Rozija Khodzhaeva.

**Grib:** The first two agreements—Start I and the Lisbon agreement—were ratified without any difficulties. Long before 4 February, Belarus had declared its course toward a nuclear-free and neutral status, and since that time it has been constantly following this promise. As for the Belarusian-Russian agreements, there were some disputes on their signing.

In my opinion, we should maintain good neighbor relations with Russia, our close neighbor. We are closely connected with Russia. Issues of arms supply, military and technical maintenance, the design of new weapons, and the teaching of staff are simply impossible without close cooperation. We have concluded interstate agreements on these issues. None of these agreements contradicts the Declaration of Belarusian sovereignty, and none of them is detrimental to Belarusian national interests.

**Khodzhaeva:** People think that Belarus's refusal to keep its nuclear arms can lead to the loss of its independence. Can these agreements harm Belarus?

**Grib:** This is the first time in world history that a small state has voluntarily refused to possess weapons of mass destruction and agreed to give them to its strong nuclear neighbor. Of course, Belarus is the first on this list, but we are sure that nuclear countries are not needed at all to ensure peace on the earth. As for our defense, we never had the codes for the nuclear missiles, so we were not their owners. First, it is difficult to imagine our potential enemy, but please, be sure, that the nuclear response would be rapid. You cannot doubt this fact. Being a nuclear target for other nuclear states means living in constant danger. Is this the kind of defense that we need? I am sure that the

image of a nonnuclear power will not damage our international prestige. Second, we will get some money for selling uranium, which will be extracted from the dismantled nuclear warheads.

**Khodzhaeva:** According to the Lisbon agreement, the withdrawal of Russian Strategic Forces from the Belarusian territory to Russia is to be accomplished within seven years. But the mass media and official circles are speaking about a two to three year period.

**Grib:** I would not speak about any definite period. The terms of the troop withdrawal depend on political, economic, and technical prerequisites. In general, everything that is connected with the disarmament issues demands a lot of deep and detailed work, and haste is out of the question. Let us speak about the restationing of the personnel of the Russian Strategic Forces. More than 30,000 servicemen are servicing the nuclear objects and nuclear arms on our territory. They are officers and warrant officers. There are no housing and other facilities for them yet in Russia. Can we demand their immediate withdrawal to Russia? We must solve a lot of problems, but in a civilized manner.

**Khodzhaeva:** As far as I know, the "heavy missiles" will be withdrawn to Russia. But, first, it is dangerous to dismantle them, second, they demand special trucks for transportation. Financial costs will be great. Did you count these costs for Belarus? What about the nuclear and ecological security?

**Grib:** The nuclear arms will be withdrawn from our territory and dismantled in Russia. Russia will finance the transportation and restationing of the troops. Belarus will not demand any customs duties from Russia. In addition, the agreement provides mutual release from the transit taxes for the Belarusian and Russian units and formations participating in maneuvers and training on Belarusian and Russian territories.

**Khodzhaeva:** Who will control the withdrawal of arms, technical equipment, and the Russian Army property?

**Grib:** First of all, expert commissions, including those from the International Atomic Energy Agency. In addition, the Council of Ministers organized a special commission from the members of the Committee for State Property. In my opinion, all the organizational issues have been solved. Currently, an intergovernmental agreement on the status of these formations and on the duration of their withdrawal is under way.

**Belarusian Legislative Action on START I Implementation****Agreement on Russian Strategic Forces Removal***WS1903114593 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belarusian  
24 Feb 93 p 3*

[Decree of the Belarusian Supreme Council "On Ratification of the Agreement Between Belarus and Russia on Strategic Forces Temporarily Stationed on the Territory of Belarus from 20 July 1992"; issued in Minsk on 4 February 1993]

[Text] The Belarusian Supreme Council decrees:

1. To ratify the agreement between Belarus and Russia on strategic forces temporarily stationed on the territory of Belarus from 20 July 1992, excluding clause four.

2. To charge the Belarusian Cabinet of Ministers to determine, together with the Russian Government, the mechanism for the withdrawal of the Russian strategic forces temporarily stationed on the Belarusian territory and to control the process of withdrawal.

[Signed] S. Shushkevich, Supreme Council Chairman of the Republic of Belarus

[Dated] Minsk, 4 February

No 2168-XII.

### START I Ratification

WS1903114793 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belarusian  
24 Feb 93 p 3

[Decree of the Belarusian Supreme Council "On Ratification of the Agreement Between the USSR and the United States of America on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms from 31 July 1991 and the Protocol to This Treaty"; issued in Minsk on 4 February 1993]

[Text] The Belarusian Supreme Council decrees:

1. To ratify the agreement between the USSR and the United States of America on reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms from 31 July 1991 and the Protocol to this Treaty signed on 23 May 1992 in Lisbon.

2. To charge the Belarusian Cabinet of Ministers to carry out the measures necessary for the implementation of this decree.

[Signed] S. Shushkevich, Supreme Council chairman of the Republic of Belarus

[Dated] Minsk, 4 February 1993

No 2165-XII.

### Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Adherence

WS1903115093 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belarusian  
24 Feb 93 p 3

[Belarusian Supreme Council's Decree "On Belarus Joining the Agreement on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Arms from 1 July 1968"; issued in Minsk on 4 February 1993]

[Text] The Belarusian Supreme Council decrees:

1. To join the Agreement on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Arms from 1 July 1968.

2. To charge the Belarusian Cabinet of Ministers to carry out the measures necessary for the implementation of this decree.

[Signed] S. Shushkevich, Supreme Council chairman of the Republic of Belarus

[Dated] Minsk, 4 February 1993

No 2166-XII.

### Russian SS-25 Converted for Commercial Satellite Launch

OW1103134593 Moscow Russian Television and Dubl Networks in Russian 2230 GMT 6 Mar 93

[From the "Aty Baty" program]

[Text] [Correspondent] What is going on in one of the test buildings at the missile test range may be regarded, in a sense, as a miracle. [Video shows rocket assembly shop, rocket in stage of assembly.]

Right before our eyes, a strategic combat missile is being transformed into a means for transporting artificial satellites into orbit. The first launch of this rocket is planned for March 1993, and there have already been prospective proposals from foreign countries. The program, Start I, promises to bring substantial commercial profit, and serves as a sensible decision for conversion problems. [Video shows fitting of the nose cone onto the rocket, then cuts to show the correspondent interviewing O.M. Yegorov, deputy chief of technical testing.]

[Correspondent] Oleg Mikhaylovich, tell us about this interesting rocket, and how the idea came about to make a commercial-purpose rocket out of a combat missile.

[Yegorov] As you know, the Russian-U.S. agreement on reducing offensive weapons provides for the liquidation of a number of systems, and, of course, it is was very disappointing to lose such rockets. We are specifically talking about the RS12M [SS-25] rocket. We had the idea to use this sufficiently powerful and mobile launch vehicle to launch space satellites. Of course, we had to do some serious work because the thrust of this rocket was not sufficient to take a satellite into orbit. That is why we had to rework this launch vehicle by adding an extra stage. Here in this building you are observing the final assembly process of this launch vehicle.

### Further Ukrainian Discussion of START Issue

#### President Scores Russian Stance on Missile Ownership

OW1103160893 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1533 GMT 11 Mar 93

[Report on "exclusive" interview with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk by INTERFAX correspondent Boris Grishchenko; place and date not given; by diplomatic correspondents Andrey Borodin, Igor Porshnev, and Dimitriy Voskoboynikov; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The solution of the problem of strategic missiles in Ukraine is to a great extent being hindered by the "dead-end" formulation of the crucial question, said Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk in an exclusive interview with special Interfax correspondent Boris Grishchenko.

The Ukrainian leader pointed out that Kiev has been suggesting to Moscow that it sign an agreement according to which the Russian Federation would have the right to carry out technical and other supervision of strategic missiles located in Ukraine. The president recalled that there are 130 such missiles in the country.



He also added that there are another 46 missiles, though they are staffed by Ukrainian specialists jointly with their Russian counterparts.

In order to open the way for Russian personnel to supervise the missiles, Ukraine is being asked to agree that all such weapons on its territory are to be the property of Russia, explained Kravchuk. But there is a law passed by the Supreme Council of our country, recalled the president, which states that everything on Ukrainian territory is the property of our state. Russia has the same sort of law, he said. "Would Ukraine ever lay claim to missile complexes located, say, in the Tambov oblast?" In the opinion of the Ukrainian president, in order to solve these problems, "we should not change laws, but rather find fundamentally new approaches to the question." In particular, explained Kravchuk, Ukraine could lay claim not to the entire value of the given missiles, but only to a part of the value of the materials in the missile warheads.

The full interview with the Ukrainian president will be published in coming issues of Interfax Presidential Bulletin.

#### Foreign Minister on Security, Economic Aspects

LD1303201793

[Editorial Report] Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian at 1500 GMT on 13 March carries a one hour phone-in program with the participation of Ukraine Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko.

Following a brief introduction, Zlenko replies to questions on the principles of Ukrainian foreign policy; the procedure of diplomatic appointments; the division of the former USSR foreign debt and property abroad; the availability of Ukrainian Embassy premises abroad; the influence of the Russian Congress of People's Deputies on Ukrainian communist activity; dual citizenship and citizenship in general; and Ukrainian foreign policy toward Latin America.

Answering a question on the nuclear issue, Zlenko says: "In general, I would like to say that, indeed, the issue of Ukraine becoming nuclear or non-nuclear has lately become acute, and it would not be an exaggeration to say that the future of Ukraine as an independent state will depend upon how it is settled. This is, at present, the central issue in our political relations with other states.

"I would like to say the following in this connection: At least three aspects of this issue need to be taken into consideration in order to settle the nuclear dilemma with which Ukraine is faced.

"First of all, there is the connection with ensuring the national security of Ukraine, both in a narrow sense—such as the military—and in the widest sense, i.e. the influence upon the further development of the state.

"Second, there is the influence of Ukraine's nuclear or non-nuclear choice on the volume and rate of the implementation of economic reform in Ukraine and its progress along the path of building a democratic society with a developed economy.

"And third, there is the effect this or the other decision will have on the place occupied by Ukraine in the world, in particular within the geostrategic space of Europe, which is most important to us.

"The activity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in respect of the nuclear policy of Ukraine from the outset has been based on the analysis of the above-mentioned factors."

Anatoliy Zlenko further answered a number of questions on such aspects of Ukrainian foreign policy as the issue of Ukrainian citizenship for Belgian Ukrainians; the recognition of Ukraine and its borders by the world community; and the oil issue.

#### Parliamentary Discussion of START I

AU1303182993 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian  
10 Mar 93 p 2

[Report by Valentyn Labunskyy: "START I: To Hurry Slowly"]

[Text] The first public parliamentary hearings on the "Preparation of 'START I' for Ratification" were held. Members of the working deputies group that is preparing the treaty for ratification, expert lawyers, and Ukraine's people's deputies took part.

In his introductory speech, leader of the deputies group, Yu. Kostenko, emphasized that the group had started working immediately after the Lisbon Protocol was concluded and, over this period of time, already prepared much material. Professor P. Martynenko, specialist in the sphere of international law, pointed out that every state must take care of its own security and the effectiveness thereof. According to the norms of international law, Ukraine has no juridical obligations and must decide on its own, proceeding from considerations of its own security, whether it should or should not have nuclear weapons. Attempts by some states to put pressure on Ukraine and demand its immediate nuclear disarmament are legally ungrounded.

What are the main factors that prevent Ukraine from quickly ratifying START I and the Lisbon Protocol? There are three of them: guarantees of future security for a nuclear-free Ukraine, provision of capital to cover the expenses on dismantling and destroying nuclear weapons, and compensation for the uranium and plutonium that are comprised in nuclear warheads.

"It is ridiculous," said Ukraine's People's Deputy O. Shevchenko during the hearings, "to expect that after Ukraine's unilateral nuclear disarmament, Russia will provide reliable guarantees and will adhere to them. History teaches us that our northern neighbor repeatedly treated international agreements like worthless pieces of paper. Ukraine's joining NATO might become a real guarantee for our security, but this is incompatible with the nonparticipation in blocs that was declared by Ukraine."

In the past, we were bombarded by Soviet propaganda that was trying to convince us of Uncle Sam's insidiousness. Today, we are inclined to state that this was not entirely groundless. It is hard to call the attitude on the part of the White House toward the problems of eliminating nuclear weapons anything but odd. On the one hand, Washington

declares about its all-around support for Ukraine's initiatives regarding its nuclear-free status, but on the other hand, it wants the process of nuclear disarmament to take place immediately, without taking into account our state's security. Moreover, the United States is seriously negotiating with Russia the possibility of selling the uranium and plutonium that are contained in operational-tactical missiles that Ukraine transferred to Russia for destruction. The \$175 million that we were promised by the American side for implementing the project for the destruction of our strategic nuclear weapons is obviously insufficient.

Therefore, Ukraine may join START I. However, it is its right and not in any way its duty. Regarding the Lisbon Protocol, in the opinion of experts, it is not desirable to join it today, because this will harm our state's security. Nor should we hasten with START I. There are still many question marks there. This is because, as Professor P. Martynenko said at the aforementioned hearings, Ukraine's nuclear status is the best guarantee for its security.

The parliamentary hearings on the question of the ratification of START I will continue.

**Rukh Leader Links NATO Membership, START**  
*OW1303145293 Moscow INTERFAX in English*  
1405 GMT 13 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The chairman of Ukraine's Popular Rukh [Ukraine People's Movement for Perestroika] Vyacheslav Chornovil believes that joining the NATO alliance could be the sole guarantee for this nation's security after the liquidation of nuclear weapons. Appearing at a press conference on Friday [12 March] in Kiev which was devoted to the outcome of his tour to the United States and Canada, he sharply criticized Russian President Boris Yeltsin's statement "about Russia's special role in maintaining peace on CIS territory." "Imperial circles,—he said,—are striving to turn Russia into a gendarme over one sixth of the planet." Chornovil declared that during his conversations with the Canadian parliamentarians he emphasized the threat to Ukraine's independence on the part of Russia in which "the political instability caused by the activation of revenge forces has reached its critical point." According to Chornovil, he called on the Canadian politicians to precisely determine their position with respect to security guarantees for Ukraine. He stressed the necessity "to establish priority in rendering western aid to the states of 'the buffer zone' between Europe and the instable Russia." Chornovil declared that the issue on security guarantees is the key one in the ratification process of the START-I Treaty by Ukraine's Supreme Soviet. He called the parliament to thoroughly examine the treaty before the ratification because, he said, this document had been developed without Ukraine's participation.

**Rejects 'Ultimatums,' Demands Guarantees**  
*LD1303190393*

[Editorial Report] Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian at 2000 GMT on 12 March carries a report on

a 12 March news conference given by Rukh Chairman Vyacheslav Chornovil on his return from a visit to the United States and Canada.

During his visit, Chornovil stated his views on nuclear disarmament. The correspondent notes that Chornovil half jokingly told the press conference that Ukraine is known in America mainly because of the problem of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament and that, therefore, if this problem did not exist, it would be worth inventing it.

On the subject of nuclear disarmament, Chornovil notes, "Before I left on my trip, I met Leonid Kravchuk in order to ascertain whether the government's position regarding this problem had changed. I spoke to the minister of foreign affairs. Insofar as the position of Rukh is very close to the government position, at least the way it is... [pauses] the way it was at the moment of my departure—because it could change in some way—I was, one could say, a representative of the government position as well.

"I can briefly report the main points of this position. First, we do not want to be spoken to in the language of ultimatums. I told this to American senators as well. I said to them: Imagine that some country was prompting the United States on how many days, or how much time, it should (?work) on examining some draft law or other, and that country posed conditions that if you do not examine it in this way, but in another way, then we will try a (?total) economic blockade, or use some other measures. This is not a dignified tone of conversation with a state, an independent state, which Ukraine is. This is one thing. After all, the U.S. Congress examined the START I Treaty over 10 months. It is demanded of us that we do this over several days.

"Second, this treaty was elaborated without Ukraine's participation. It touches on the interests of Ukraine, and in essential ways. And so our Supreme Council, if it is capable of this, should examine this treaty very thoroughly. It can make some remarks, it can make some observations.

"I said that the situation to the east of us is very unstable; that Russia is itself on the verge of breakdown, that both right- and left-wing forces, which are in blocs among themselves, have raised their profiles greatly, and that Yeltsin's position has been shaken. In the event of Yeltsin's fall, no one (?from the Democrats) will come to power; anything can happen. If even politicians of Ruskoy's type are speaking of territorial claims on Ukraine, then what is to be said about politicians of Zhirinovskiy's type?

"Well, in this situation we need security guarantees and political guarantees. We would not have anything against Russia taking on obligations and America and other countries of the West coming forward as a guarantor that no problems between Ukraine and Russia will ever, under any circumstances, be resolved through force, that no one will raise the issue of territorial claims to Ukraine, and that no one will make use of the economy as a means of political blackmail on our independent state."

Regarding the financial issue of nuclear disarmament, Chornovil says: "The discussion was about the huge material expenditure needed for dismantling our nuclear potential. The \$175 million that America supposedly allocated

for this in advance—although it has not given a cent so far—this is a very insufficient sum. The talk could be about several billions.

"I spoke about the need for a serious international commission of experts to establish the sum that we need. A need to set up an international nuclear disarmament fund could arise, of which Japan, and Western countries would be a part. And little by little each would join in reducing nuclear tension. I (?denied) that Rukh, (?like the government), occupies an undefined position. Rukh particularly objects to the removal of nuclear weapons to the territory of Russia. I simply proposed that alternative ways be sought."

The correspondent goes on to say that issues of assistance to Ukraine, an international Chernobyl fund, an international anticommunist conference, Rukh and its tasks at the present stage, and other issues were discussed. The correspondent concludes that Chornovil's trip was successful.

#### **Kiev Seeks 'More Reliable' Guarantees**

OW2203191193 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1855 GMT 22 Mar 93

[From the "Politics, Economy" section of the INTERFAX "Business Report"—item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Ukraine counts on receiving from U.N. Security Council member states more reliable nuclear security guarantees, as well as extra resources to compensate for spending on the liquidation, according to the START-1 treaty, of nuclear weapons.

Anatoliy Zlenko, the Ukrainian foreign minister, should, during his visit (starting March 23) to the U.S., report to Washington on the Ukrainian parliament's preparations to ratify the Soviet-U.S. treaty. Speaking Sunday [21 March] evening on republican television, Zlenko said most deputies were not satisfied with the \$176 Mn [million] in U.S. aid, allocated to help the republic destroy its nuclear weapons.

Ukraine is the last republic in the former Soviet Union not to have ratified the 1991 Soviet-U.S. START-1 treaty.

#### **Further Reports on Russian Consideration of START II Ratification**

##### **Parliamentary Hearings To Open 29 Mar**

OW1503193993 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1927 GMT 15 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The next round of parliamentary hearings on preparations for the Supreme Soviet's ratification of the START II Treaty is planned to begin March 29. Sergey Stepashin, chairman of the parliamentary Committee on Issues of Defense and Security, told INTERFAX this on Monday [15 March].

He explained that the 2-week postponement was made at the request of the Russian Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations, whose leadership believes that "the hearings have thus far been somewhat one-sided." The committee's leadership plans to bring in independent experts. In addition,

Stepanov said, upon invitation from the Russian parliament on March 18-19 a large delegation—up to 12 people—from the U.S. Congress will visit Moscow. The delegation will be led by Chairman of the U.S. Senate Armed Forces Committee Sam Nunn. On March 19 Vice President of the North Atlantic Assembly Karsten Foyt will also arrive in Moscow.

Stepashin stressed that they are coming to Moscow not only out of their desire to participate in preparations for the START II ratification, but also due to their "serious concern with the situation which developed after the Congress of People's Deputies regarding the violation of the political balance in Russia."

The chairman of the parliamentary committee expressed his wish that at the parliamentary hearings supporters and opponents of START II would present a measured military, political, and technical analyses of the document, and "not limit themselves to emotional and highly unsubstantiated charges that (the treaty) does not correspond to Russia's interests, as was the case at the first round of hearings."

#### **Legislator, NATO Aide Discuss Ratification**

PM1803132393 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
18 Mar 93 p 1

[Vladimir Vladimirov report from the "From Our News Bureau" roundup: "Admiral Paul Miller Met With Chairman of Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Defense and Security Committee"]

[Text] At Russia's White House 16 March Admiral Paul Miller, commander in chief of NATO Allied Armed Forces in the Atlantic, who is in Moscow at the invitation of the Russian Federation defense minister, and parliamentary committee chairman Sergey Stepashin discussed the ratification of the START II Treaty.

It was noted during the talks that the treaty ratification process is progressing with some difficulty in the Supreme Soviet, as proved by the first round of parliamentary hearings which took place at the beginning of March. But Sergey Stepashin hopes that the treaty will be ratified.

The interlocutors devoted much attention to NATO's new role following the end of the cold war: In particular, questions of the prospects for cooperation between NATO structures and the Russian Armed Forces within the CSCE framework were broached.

#### **Opposition Deputies Criticize Treaty**

MK1903053993 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI  
in Russian No 12, 21 Mar 93 p A14

[["MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI International Department" report under "The World and Us" rubric: "START-II: A Way Out or a Trap for Russia?"]]

[Excerpt] The Supreme Soviet debate that began in March on the ratification of the START-II treaty signed by Boris Yeltsin and George Bush on 3 January 1993 has been distinguished, as expected, by fierce attacks from its opponents. It is clear to anybody that the attacks were prompted not so much by the provisions of the treaty itself, but by their hostility to the fundamentals of Boris Yeltsin's political course. In this respect the struggle over



the ratification of START-II will undoubtedly become an integral part of the opposition's efforts aimed against the incumbent president.

At the same time, since it is a specific document that is under discussion, the leaders of the "intransigent" opposition appear to understand that rhetoric alone is not sufficient and that they need some concrete arguments. Let us cite some of them.

Deputy Pavlov: "The United States has always dreamed of getting rid of the threat of an assured nuclear counterstrike from Russia. START-II enables it to achieve this end."

Deputy Tarasov: "It is the MIRV-ed ICBM's that constitute the bulk of our nuclear missile deterrent forces and give Russia at least technically the status of a great power. Liquidating them would mean that this status was abolished and the country's defense capability undermined. Calculations show that, if START-II is adopted, the United States will achieve an overwhelming superiority (by 36 times) in terms of all indicators of strategic power: the number of nuclear weapons [boyezaryad], their accuracy, and their yield—which is bound to undermine strategic parity..."

Deputy Sevastyanov: "Only 17 percent of our strategic expenditure on nuclear weapons went on strategic missiles, whereas 83 percent went on submarines and nuclear bombers. What will be cut as a result of the treaty are precisely our cheapest weapons. So we are losing out here even in purely economic terms."

A number of other arguments are advanced against ratification. For example: Why did we sign a treaty with the outgoing Bush administration, and is there is an element of conspiracy here? Or: START-II will draw Russia into a ruinous disarmament race and will cost it several tens of trillions of rubles.

START-II is certainly a very complex treaty. So is Russia's situation. It therefore quite understandably raises questions even among those who do not consider themselves in opposition to the president's line. At least the debate has shown a desire on the part of some deputies to seriously understand what the treaty really means for Russia. [passage omitted]

#### **Russian Defense Ministry Discusses START I Implementation**

OW1603202793 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1943 GMT 16 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Russian Defense Ministry Board discussed at its Tuesday [16 March] session a number of urgent issues, in particular, preparedness of the armed services to implement the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START-I. The agenda also included improvement of the performance and new objectives of military news media in the context of a reduced military budget and increasing printing costs. A decision was made to reform and reduce the number of periodicals.

#### **Russian Military Said To Find START II 'Advantageous'**

MK1603131493 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 16 Mar 93 p 2

[Article by military observer Vadim Solovyev under "Carte Blanche" rubric: "START II: View From Russian Defense Ministry. Fears of the Military and the Treaty's Critics Do Not Coincide"]

[Text] The first treaty on reducing strategic offensive weapons (START I) took Soviet and U.S. specialists over nine years to prepare. Its signing took place a few days before the events of August 1991. On the Soviet side political considerations concerning the soonest possible clinching of the START I Treaty prevailed over military and technical considerations, and the presidents' signatures legalized a certain distortion of the balance in the United States' favor.

START II was prepared more quickly. In February 1992 the Russian and U.S. presidents defined a concept, in June they defined general criteria, and 6 months later they signed it. The Russian military was totally satisfied with the results of the treaty (in particular, it had been possible to eliminate START I's distortions). However, people are criticizing the military, accusing them of undermining Russia's defense capability; of favoring an economically detrimental treaty; and of being hasty, in that Russia's military doctrine has not been confirmed, and so on.

Russian military specialists do not believe this; on the contrary, they believe that START II is more advantageous to Russia, in that the United States is reducing nuclear weapons more. The U.S. potential for delivering a first strike is reduced fourfold through the elimination of the warheads of high-accuracy MX and Minuteman-3 missiles and of one-half of the warheads of Trident-2 sea-launched missiles. The sides have pledged to reduce the number of nuclear warheads by two-thirds to a level of 3,000 to 3,500 within this treaty's 10-year implementation period—before 1 January 2003.

The following question is possible: Given such a vague level of reduction, will one of the sides not be tempted to create and exploit a numerical advantage of 500 warheads? According to the assessment of Major General Dmitriy Kharchenko, leader of the Ministry of Defense International Treaty Directorate, this is immaterial. The possession of nuclear warheads at a level of 3,000 makes it possible to destroy everything on Earth several times over, if not the planet itself. The figure of 3,000 to 3,500 nuclear warheads was prescribed for purely political reasons, simply to ensure that a state's every subsequent move can be seen.

Incidentally, this is not the START II Treaty's only "vague criterion." A strictly fixed threshold was prescribed only for nuclear warheads that are deployed on submarines—no more than 1,750 units. By deducting this prescribed number of warheads on submarines from the total level of 3,000 to 3,500 nuclear warheads, each country can determine how many and which warheads it can have in ground-based ICBM's and heavy bombers. The treaty makes it possible to carry out a structural distribution of nuclear warheads according to armed services—they will

be considered and determined. Optimal variants will be chosen for all three components of the nuclear triad.

Opponents of the agreement on strategic offensive weapons will not be able to refrain from making accusations that Russia is being deprived of powerful types of strategic weapons: heavy missiles and MIRV'ed missiles. But in actual fact this is no bad thing—quite the reverse. The point is that these missiles were produced on Ukrainian territory, and those put on alert status will have ended their guaranteed service life exactly by 2003, when, under the treaty, all of them will have to be destroyed. But to set up such plants in Russia would entail the most enormous expenditure. Furthermore, this type of missile is not the last word in technology. The treaty permits the 90 launchers no longer needed for these missiles to be converted to deploy missiles carrying one warhead and which are produced on Russian territory (this is also economic expediency, incidentally).

There is another fear. Russia and the United States, although they are leaders of the nuclear club, are not its only members; besides them there is Britain, France, and China. Russian military specialists consider this factor to be immaterial, however, in that these three countries will be able to have no more than 1,700 nuclear warheads by 2000. At least partly under the influence of START II, however, nuclear development programs are also being curtailed there, and it is to be expected that their combat potential will remain at the present level (1,000 nuclear warheads). A further nuclear arms reduction (after START II) should certainly affect all five states.

Another trump held by the treaty's opponents is that Russia has not yet adopted a military doctrine but is already setting about reducing its most powerful weapons. Is this not contrary to its national interests? The Russian military has no doubts here. It is obvious that the military doctrine will be of an exclusively defensive nature—Russia has no enemies and is making no claims against other countries. Furthermore, the weapons that are to remain under the treaty are quite adequate to fulfill a nuclear deterrent role, and are even more than adequate. The Russian military, Kharchenko reassures us, have not calculated this just once. Doubts that Russia will not be able to carry out the destruction of weapons within the deadlines set by the treaty are also groundless. "We are capable of converting, disarming, and eliminating weapons under norms exceeding the prescribed level. How rapidly this can be done is another question. Many countries have an interest in ensuring that we reach these levels considerably earlier. Help is being offered and talks are going on, but there are no final solutions as yet. There are talks with France on the delivery of special equipment, mainly containers for transporting nuclear warheads. There are talks with the United States on creating the technologies and production capacities to process weapons-grade plutonium. In short, questions about help being offered and Russia's chances of autonomously meeting its destruction commitments are in no way connected," Maj. Gen. Kharchenko asserts.

The military's fears are of a different kind. One of the snags is the 1972 ABM Treaty. If the U.S. side takes it into its head to push through the "star wars" program known as SDI that was announced in the old days, it will

come into conflict with the ABM Treaty and then Russia will be forced to freeze START II. However, there are currently no grounds for considering such a variant, because the Pentagon is not going beyond the ABM Treaty's framework. But to make absolutely sure, talks and the signing of the necessary agreements are needed. There are also other problems which should likewise be solved at the negotiating table.

Another difficulty in implementing the START treaties is associated with Kiev's "nuclear maneuvers." Having declared the strategic nuclear weapons on its territory its property, Ukraine would like to make a profit out of processing nuclear warheads into fuel for nuclear electric power stations. President Boris Yeltsin is not objecting to the question's being formulated in this way, but first of all he proposes to calculate how much the construction of such a plant will cost (there is still not one of them on Russian territory) and what sort of profit there will ultimately be—with a plus or a minus sign. Meanwhile the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory, defined by the Lisbon Protocol as Russian, are falling into neglect.

### Russian-Ukrainian Talks on START I Viewed

PM1703142793 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
16 Mar 93 p 3

[Article by Nikolay Musiyenko: "Shreds Instead of Nuclear 'Umbrella'"]

[Text] The deal in Belovezhskaya Forest between the three presidents "elected by all the people" who trampled on Soviet people's desire to live in a single family continues to reverberate in various disputes between what only recently were union republics. Or to be more precise between the regimes which have come to rule there. Disputes about "who is eating whose food" and the division of common property are, according to the calculations of the "sovereign" rulers, designed to set fraternal peoples against each other forever. A principle as old as the world: Divide and rule.

The Soviet Armed Forces were a particular threat to the "putschists." That is why they began first of all to separate them into national compartments. The shameful row over the Black Sea Fleet can be heard by everyone. Now it is the turn of the main guarantor of our security—the troops equipped with nuclear weapons.

It is a fact that the latest round of talks between the Russian and Ukrainian delegations on settling questions connected with the implementation of the START I Treaty and with ensuring the nuclear and ecological safety of the strategic nuclear forces on Ukrainian territory was futile. Scarcely had the participants in the dialogue parted before a quite sharp statement came from Kiev, from the head of the Ukrainian delegation, Yuriy Kostenko, Ukrainian minister of environmental conservation, who accused the Russian partners of all kinds of sins. In particular of the fact that they allegedly want to compel Ukraine to recognize the strategic nuclear forces deployed on its territory as Russian.

In addition Kiev, regarding the nuclear components of weapons in Ukraine as its own property, fears that Moscow may "swindle" it. That is why the Russian delegation's proposal to withdraw to Russian Federation central bases

close to factories [predzavodskiye bazy] the nosecones of ICBMs and their warheads and also long-range cruise missile nuclear munitions with a view to their subsequent dismantling.

The Russian side's haste is entirely understandable—the Russian Federation Government is anxious to fulfill the order of its favorite “uncle across the ocean” as rapidly as possible and not only to disarm unilaterally itself but also to push its “uppity” little neighbor in the same direction. After all, as long as Ukraine does not ratify the START I Treaty it is pointless for Russia to start thinking about the START II Treaty which the president is pushing through. By its obstinacy Kiev is essentially saving Russia from wholesale disarmament.

Meanwhile Ukraine for its part is displaying circumspection, is trying to elicit as many dollars as possible so it is in no hurry to put itself in the wake of the ship with the tricolor flag although it has repeatedly assured the world public that its dream is to have the status of a nonnuclear power. It is true that the geopolitical nuclear balance here will definitively collapse.

Incidentally, the United States' NATO allies are in no hurry at all to become nuclear-free. Against this background the desire of the rulers of Russia and Ukraine, crying “mine! Mine!” to tear their common nuclear “umbrella” into pitiful shreds only plays into the hand of our Western “friends”—then there will be nothing to prevent them from dictating their will to both republics.

In “Igor's Lay” the anonymous author warned of the pernicious consequences for Rus to which disputes between the dukes would lead. But as we can see history is teaching us nothing...

## CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

### Further on Russian Troop Withdrawal From Germany

#### New Agreement on Withdrawal Schedule

93WC0021A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian  
3 Feb 93 p 10

[Report by Anastasiya Romashkevich: “Accommodations for the Military Should Be Built More Quickly”]

[Text] Colonel General Matvey Burlakov, commander of the Western Group of Forces, announced in the Russian Embassy in Berlin yesterday the results of a meeting of the Russian-German Troop Withdrawal Commission which was held last week. According to the decision adopted, 90 percent of the Russian forces stationed on the territory of Germany will have been withdrawn before the end of 1993.

The commission session confirmed the final date of the troop withdrawal and adjusted its timetable: 90 percent will be withdrawn in 1993, the remaining 10 percent will have left by 31 August 1994. There are 370,000 Russian soldiers in the FRG at this time, that is, 40 percent of the contingent there earlier (in the cold war period the United States had 270,000 men in the FRG).

Some 211,000 Russian servicemen had been withdrawn from East Germany by the end of 1992. In December 1992, FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Boris Yeltsin

agreed to shorten the timeframe of the troop withdrawal by 4 months. In exchange Russia received an additional DM550 million for the construction of accommodations for the servicemen.

The original plan for the construction of accommodations for the servicemen withdrawn from Germany approved in March 1991 by USSR Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov contemplated more than 50 percent of the apartments being located in Ukraine. But the latter requested for this construction DM4.1 million, to which Russia did not agree. In October 1991 the plan was reoriented toward Russia and, with negligible adjustments, is in effect at this time. In accordance with this plan, the construction of accommodations for the Russian military will be completed only by the end of 1994, which, in the opinion of the German side, complicates the troop withdrawal.

Your KOMMERSANT correspondent was informed in the Russian Foreign Ministry that there is no “precise linkage” between the troop withdrawal timescale and the presentation of the accommodations, but that it is in Russia's interests to accelerate the latter. The Foreign Ministry believes that the main contradiction between Russia and Germany on the question of the troop withdrawal was the nonparticipation of firms of East Germany in the construction of the accommodations, but that “this problem has now been resolved.”

#### Timetable of Withdrawal of Servicemen From Germany

Date	Servicemen Withdrawn	Servicemen Remaining
12-31-90	—	800,000
12-31-91	219,000	581,000
12-31-92	211,000	370,000
12-31-93	333,000	37,000
8-31-94	37,000	0

#### Withdrawal Continues Smoothly

AU1803115393 Berlin NEUE ZEIT in German  
13 Mar 93 p 3

[Holger Arnhold report: “Missile Fuel ‘Melange’ Also Returns to East”]

[Text] Berlin—At the loading base of the CIS forces in Kleinhahnen near Cottbus, underground silos full of missile fuels must be emptied. The highly explosive liquid is destined to be transported back to Russia via the Baltic Sea ferry port of Mukran. Since German safety regulations are very strict, the German-Russian working group is involved in the transportation. It is one of a total of 12 teams of the joint commission that have been established on the basis of the treaty on the stay and withdrawal of the CIS forces concluded on 12 October 1990.

“We did not know the exact chemical composition of the fuel, which the Russians convincingly called ‘melange,’” Werner Zielesch, the head of the working group, says. It first had to be determined by a chemist; the diagnosis was then sent to Bonn for assessment. In addition, it was unclear whether the tank cars provided by the Russians for

the transportation corresponded to German transportation regulations. The removal of the fuel threatened to be delayed because to get an exceptional permit for the transportation of liquids from Berlin to Hamburg usually takes about one and a half years. The working group managed to get the permit in one and a half months because the Russian withdrawal was also an absolute priority in foreign policy.

Regardless of this example, Ulrich Klimke, the head of the Berlin branch office of the FRG Transportation Ministry, says that the transportation problems linked with the Russian withdrawal are largely unspectacular. Nevertheless, it is a very demanding project in terms of logistics. After all, the former Soviet Army had about 546,200 men stationed on GDR territory, including 338,000 soldiers. In total, 111,900 weapons systems and vehicles and 676,000 tonnes of ammunition were on German soil. Almost 90 percent of the transports go by train and ship, the rest travel on roads. Armed personnel is flown out via the Sperenberg military airport. The nuclear weapons were removed from Germany by 30 July 1991.

On 17 August 1990, on the occasion of the meeting between Kohl and Gorbachev, the German side expressed its readiness to contribute 1 billion German marks to the costs of the transports to the then Soviet border—now Belarus, the Baltic States, and Ukraine. Since the western German railroad military rates were valid for that, the Russians benefit greatly, Werner Zielesch says. He was involved in the approximate calculations—at that time still as an expert for train transports in the service of a civilian NATO body.

Zielesch cultivates close contacts with General Chernilevskiy and Colonel Plyuta, his partners from the Western Group. The working group primarily has moderating functions, examines the planned projects, and intervenes if something does not work.

Mukran, the ferry port on the island of Ruegen, is now one of the most important loading and unloading places. Last year, 35-45 percent of the entire loading and unloading involved Russian military goods. With 5.5 percent of the entire goods traffic, the Western Group of the CIS Forces is currently the largest single client of the eastern German railroads. Since many other partners from the industry have disappeared, this means the preservation of many jobs: The Russians and the German Sea Shipyard have agreed on the transportation of at least 15,750 wide-gauge cars to Kleipeda in 1993. The competition does not sleep. Czechs and Slovaks have also expressed their interest in this business and grant discounts. "But it is not the price alone that counts, but also the quality of loading, observation of the safety regulations, and punctuality," Zielesch says. The Russians realized that very quickly. Ever since 1991, the Western Group was in arrears with payments to the Polish railroads. Bills due are sent to the eastern German railroads, which pass them on to Wuensdorf.

During the lading in the sea ports of Mukran and Rosstock, the members of the working group can check exactly what the Russians remove, the German coordinator said. "The railroad transports, which are put together in Frankfurt/Oder and are sent though Poland toward Brest, are sealed. We have not had any reason to doubt the

Russians' honesty so far." Therefore, Zielesch rules out that trading goods are smuggled in such transports. The transportation officers are well acquainted with German safety regulations.

### Russian Commentaries on Troop Withdrawal Talks With Latvia

#### 'Impasse' Seen

*MK1803140493 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Mar 93 p 2*

[Dmitriy Zhdannikov report under "Talks" rubric: "Moscow-Riga: Another Round. Citizenship Question Will Not Be Discussed"]

[Text] Another round of Russian-Latvian talks has opened in Moscow.

The Russian delegation is headed by Sergey Zotov, ambassador for special assignments, and the Latvian by State Minister Janis Dinevics. Matters under discussion relate to social safety nets for servicemen, retired military men, and civilian personnel (workers and clerks at military enterprises of the former Soviet Army). The draft documents were coordinated earlier at the level of expert groups from the two states.

The problem of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Latvia has effectively reached an impasse. The Latvian delegation declined to include it in the list of draft documents even at the expert groups level.

With regard to the question of citizenship, according to the Russian side its consideration can be put off because the Latvian legislation now completely rules out the republic's citizenship for the military.

Draft agreements "On Aspects of the Operation of Air Transport in the Airspace of the Latvian Republic" and "On Aspects of the Regime of Entry Into Latvian Ports by Russian Ships," which had been discussed previously at the level of expert groups, were also drawn up.

The list of draft documents also includes a treaty on the use of 17 military enterprises on Latvian territory. Its purpose is to provide a basis for agreement between the two sides on the avoidance of unilateral changes in the status of military facilities. In this draft the Russian side insists on the conversion of the enterprises and the creation of Russian-Latvian joint ventures on the basis of the facilities. It is expected that a package of social-humanitarian issues related to cooperation in education, including university studies, and migration will also be discussed at the Latvian-Russian interstate talks.

#### Russian Delegation Head Blames Latvia

*WS2303083693 Tallinn BNS in English 1136 GMT 22 Mar 93*

[Text] Riga, Mar 22, BNS—Sergey Zotov, the leader of the Russian delegation at negotiations with Latvia, blamed Latvia for delaying the basic accord on the withdrawal of the Russian troops.

In a news conference in Moscow Friday [19 March], Zotov announced that Russia will remain firm on the final terms



of the withdrawal. The deadline demanded by Latvia—to withdraw the troops until the end of this year—is still strictly opposed by Russia.

The Latvian daily *Diena* cites Zotov as saying that “if Latvia [ words indistinct]. Latvia’s position is influenced by the coming election campaign, he said. Because of that, anti-Russian moods flourish in Latvia, and aggravate the process of negotiations.” Zotov says he does not expect any progress in the talks until after the 5th Saeima election.

The unsettled issues of military property, social guarantees for Russian military and the unclear future of strategic objects also delay the signing of the basic accord, Zotov explained.

The accord on social guarantees for Russian military and resigned officers was discussed at this round of negotiations. While Latvia was ready to sign the agreement, Zotov said that the accord was not signed, because Latvia introduced its proposals at the last moment.

Zotov stressed that during this round of talks, Russia focused on the issue of Russian residents’ rights in Latvia, and announced: “Our opinion is that the policy of Russian-speaking residents’ dislodging will continue in Latvia at official level.”

Zotov noted that the protection of Russian citizens’ rights is the priority of Russia’s foreign policy.

Therefore, the Russian delegation will “continue to do everything possible to defend Russians in Latvia,” he said.

However, Zotov says he hopes that in future Russia and Latvia become friendly states that will not interfere in each others’ internal affairs.

Zotov rejected the notion that a proposal to discuss Russians’ rights in an international forum interferes with Latvia’s internal affairs.

#### **Reports on Russian Troop Withdrawal From Lithuania**

##### **Lithuanian Defense Minister Comments**

*LD2003181193 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network  
in Lithuanian 1300 GMT 19 Mar 93*

[Interview with National Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius by unidentified correspondent in Vilnius; date not given—recorded]

[Text] Yesterday, the Russian ambassador in Lithuania held a meeting with Lithuanian Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius:

[Begin recording] **Butkevicius:** We discussed a whole range of issues concerning mutual relations between the Ministries of Defense of Lithuania and Russia. I was interested in the statement by Mr. Kozyrev in Kaliningrad that the withdrawal of Russian troops might be stopped if an agreement on social guarantees for Russian officers present in Lithuania is not signed.

I received a reply that Russia has not changed its stand on the withdrawal of troops. I also received a reply that international agreements must be observed, including the agreement between Lithuania and Russia signed on 8 September regulating the rate of the withdrawal of Russian

troops from Lithuania. I think, therefore, that the withdrawal and the progress of the withdrawal will continue, and we can talk about the complete withdrawal of Russian troops by 31 August.

**Correspondent:** What do contacts between the Defense Ministries of Lithuania and Russia imply?

**Butkevicius:** Contacts between the ministers are contacts between chief representatives on the withdrawal of Russian troops. There are contacts between the staff of the representatives on troop withdrawals, problems of transit through Lithuania to Kaliningrad Oblast, and transit of Russian troops from Germany. There are also many issues concerning property.

**Correspondent:** Do these contacts not imply the sale of military hardware?

**Butkevicius:** Yes, they imply everything.

**Correspondent:** You have stated at a news conference that you support Lithuania’s membership in NATO. Does it not contradict the decision of Lithuanian citizens adopted in the referendum on [words indistinct]?

**Butkevicius:** I think it is much too early to speak of Lithuania’s membership in NATO. Moreover, nobody in Europe knows at present what NATO will look like and what the issues of security in Europe will look like. I think that NATO will become the main mechanism regulating mutual relations in security. In this case, our participation and contacts with NATO [words indistinct] for a state that can ensure its security only with the aid of collective security. I do not think that such a stand is contrary to our attitude toward the presence of foreign troops on our territory. Security must not be ensured by the presence of foreign military bases on our territory. [end recording]

#### **Says Russian Stance ‘Alarming’**

*LD1903104193 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service  
in Lithuanian 0200 GMT 19 Mar 93*

[Text] According to National Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius, the latest statements by Russian officials on the withdrawal of the Russian Army from Lithuania are alarming. At today’s news conference, Butkevicius cited, above all, a statement by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, in which the withdrawal of the Army from Lithuania is linked with social guarantees for the military.

When the schedule on the Army withdrawal was signed in Moscow, no social guarantees were discussed, noted the defense minister. Russia also cannot justify with any defense interests the presence of large military forces in Kaliningrad Oblast. According to the minister, such statements should be discussed at the meeting of the ministers of defense of the NATO Cooperation Council that will take place on 29 March in Brussels. The Lithuanian minister will also attend the meeting.

There are more signs indicating that Russia is changing its stance on the issue of the Army withdrawal. So far, the 3d Coastal Defense Division has not been withdrawn, and military airfields in Siauliai, Panevezys, and Kedainiai are not being handed over to Lithuania, although equipment and servicemen are being pulled out.



Although there has not been an official Russian statement that it has broken the agreement and will not pull out the Army from Lithuania by 31 August of this year, Butkevicius said that all these facts are very alarming.

He also said he should meet today with Nikolay Obertyshev, Russian ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary in Lithuania, to discuss these issues.

### Claims Violation of Pullout Accord

OW1803191093 Moscow BALTFAX in English  
1824 GMT 18 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] At a briefing held on Thursday [18 March] in Vilnius, Lithuania's Home Guard Minister Audrius Butkevicius expressed his concern over the violation of the schedule for withdrawal of Russian forces from Lithuania, agreed to in September 1992.

The minister said that the 3rd Coast Guard Division has not been withdrawn yet, though its pullout should have been completed late last year; three military airdromes freed by the Russian forces have not been handed over to Lithuania. Butkevicius reported that on Thursday he intends to present the claims of the Lithuanian party to the Russian Ambassador to Vilnius Nikolay Obertyshev.

The leader of the Lithuanian military department also drew attention to the threat posed by an accumulation of an impressive number of Armed Forces in the neighboring Kaliningrad Province. Butkevicius believes that Russia cannot justify the presence of such a number of servicemen and military equipment in the center of Europe, under the neither pretext of protecting Russia nor even Kaliningrad Province.

According to the Minister, this issue is to be discussed by the international community and, in particular, at the session of the NATO Council of Cooperation scheduled for March 29 in Brussels.

### Criticizes Rate of Withdrawal

LD1803143693 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network  
in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 18 Mar 93

[Report by correspondent Vytas Usas from the Seimas studio]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] National Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius met with journalists today at a news conference which was held in the Seimas Palace. There are no official statements that the Russian troops will not be withdrawn according to schedule, the minister said. However, linking the rate of withdrawal with social guarantees is political pressure. So far, the 3d Division of the Coast Guard Troops has not been withdrawn according to schedule. There are objective reasons for this as well. The Air Force units in Zokniai, Panevezys, and Kedainiai have also violated the withdrawal schedule. The installations could have already been handed over. However, the decisions have not been made.

I will meet with Russian Ambassador Obertyshev today, the minister said, and I will present my case.

The journalists asked the minister about General Steponas Nekrosius. For some time he was an adviser to the minister

but his services were no longer required. I did not recommend him to the post of commander in chief of the troops and I will not recommend him, the minister said. In general, the minister believes that such a post is not necessary.

### Russian Envoy Toughens Stance

OW2103191393 Moscow BALTFAX in English  
1729 GMT 21 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The withdrawal of the Russian Army from Lithuania rests on the documents that formally have not taken effect. Such an opinion was voiced by Russia's Ambassador to Lithuania Nikolay Obertyshev in an interview with Lithuanian radio on Saturday.

He argued that the documents signed by the defence ministers of the two countries in Moscow last September, including a time-table for the pullout of troops, were, allegedly "a supplement to a basic accord that had not been signed".

Mr. Obertyshev said that "the policy of Russia toward troops withdrawal would remain unchanged, if official delegations of Russia and Lithuania started early talks, then continued them successfully, and crown them with a major troops withdrawal agreement and an economic cooperation treaty".

On violations of the signed time-table for the pullout of troops and delays with the withdrawal of separate army units, Mr. Obertyshev said that "this must not particularly irritate or worry the Lithuanian side", since "it's essential to aim at the deadline for withdrawal".

"Either side should meet the other half way. If no agreements are signed, Russia may change its policy"—Mr. Obertyshev said.

In keeping with an earlier accord, Russia's troops are to leave the territory of Lithuania by August 31, 1993.

### Lithuania 'Ready' To Resume Talks

OW2203130693 Moscow BALTFAX in English  
1229 GMT 22 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Our position is firm and unequivocal: Lithuania wants to restore historical justice and statehood and seeks to get Russian troops pulled out of the country", Lithuania's foreign minister Povilas Gylys has said in an interview with a Baltfax correspondent. The minister commented on a statement released by the Lithuanian foreign ministry on Sunday [21 March].

The statement says that Lithuania's new leadership sincerely wishes good mutually advantageous relations with Russia and is ready to remove obstacles to cooperation. It expects the same from Russia even in its very complex conditions, the statement says.

However, it goes on, there have lately been signs of attempts in Moscow and in Vilnius to interpret "Lithuania's good will toward Russia as a weakness of the new Lithuanian authorities, and their inclination for unilateral concessions.

"We'll do our utmost in the future so that there would be no foreign troop left in our country. We cannot make concessions that may be construed as a sign of the legalization of foreign military presence in Lithuania", the statement says.

The document declares Lithuania's readiness to resume negotiations with Russia and voices hope that they will yield the result acceptable for both countries and will promote their good neighborly ties.

#### **Lithuanian Foreign Ministry Statement**

*WS2303072693 Vilnius ELTA NEWS BULLETIN  
in English 1431 GMT 22 Mar 93*

[Statement issued by the Foreign Affairs Ministry of the Republic of Lithuania; date not given; from ELTA "NEWS BULLETIN" No. 210]

[Text] 22 March 1993—One of the most important directions of Lithuania's foreign policies—the maintenance of good relations with neighbouring states. The Russian Federation occupies a special place between Lithuania's neighbours. It is an important political and economical partner of our country.

The new Lithuanian power understands this well. It is sincerely interested in good, mutually useful relations with Russia. It is ready to remove obstacles found in the way of co-operation. It hopes for the same from the other side even under these never-ending complicated conditions of Russia.

However, recently tendencies have appeared, that Lithuania's correct, good-will view towards Russia, is trying to be interpreted by certain people in Moscow and Vilnius as the new Lithuanian power's weakness, an inclination to one-sided concessions.

On this occasion we are stating that our preparation to demonstrate good-will should not be understood as not having a clear position or fluctuation.

The strength of Lithuania's position—historical [words indistinct] Lithuania has not done any wrongs to its neighbours. History has supplied us with the possibility to rebuild our self-dependence and no one will force us to renounce it. That is why we will further strive that no foreign army remains in our state. We emphasize, that speaking on a wide scale the army's withdrawal from Lithuania is not a concession for Lithuania. It is a correction of a historical offense.

Up to 1993, the Republic of Lithuania has made many compromises. For example, it accepted the zero citizenship law version.

Lithuania is ready to renew negotiations with the Russian Federation. Understanding all the political situation and the complications of the question on negotiations, we hope that the negotiations will bring acceptable results for both sides, will use the good neighbourly relations for development between the two states.

[Signed] The Lithuanian Foreign Affairs Minister Povilas Gylys

#### **Landsbergis Comments**

*LD2203204493 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network  
in Lithuanian 1900 GMT 22 Mar 93*

[Text] A statement made by Vytautas Landsbergis, leader of the Lithuanian Seimas opposition, has been received, which reads:

Nikolay Obertyshev, Russian ambassador to Lithuania, speaking on Lithuanian Radio, said that Russia may not adhere to the Russian-Lithuanian agreements on the withdrawal of Russian troops by 31 August, in accord with the timetable confirmed by bilateral agreement. This could happen if Lithuania did not meet the conditions set by Russia, the Russian ambassador said.

Concerning this matter, Vytautas Landsbergis states that the necessity to withdraw Russian troops from Lithuania is unconditional and that a bilateral agreement for the implementation of the withdrawal timetable and two additional agreements did not foresee any conditions under for carrying out all this. On the contrary, the documents point out that the agreements come into force from the moment they are signed, and on 8 September 1992 these documents were signed by the authorized ministers of defense and national defense on behalf of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Lithuania in the presence of the heads of both states. The documents were registered at the United Nations, which noted with pleasure the existence of these agreements.

Therefore, questioning the validity of the above documents is inappropriate and politically motivated. This is a pressure demanding that Lithuania accept new conditions set by Russia, and even implies a threat that the Russian policy towards Lithuania could change. There should be no place for such actions in state relations, and ambassadors normally act to make political relations between the states as good as possible, unless Mr. Obertyshev has a different kind of assignment, Vytautas Landsbergis said.

**Division of Armor, Artillery Among Republics**

93UM0315A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 21 Dec 92 p 2

[Article by ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI Correspondent Sergey Ovsienko: "How They Divided the Military Equipment and Weaponry"]

[Text]

	Azerbaijan	Armenia	Belarus	Moldova	Georgia	Russia (in the area of employment)	Ukraine
Combat tanks	no more than 220	no more than 220	no more than 1,800	no more than 210	no more than 220	no more than 6,400	no more than 4,080
Including in regular units	no more than 220	no more than 220	no more than 1,525	no more than 210	no more than 220	no more than 4,975	no more than 3,130
Armored combat vehicles	no more than 220	no more than 220	no more than 2,600	no more than 210	no more than 220	no more than 11,480	no more than 5,050
Including in regular units	no more than 220	no more than 220	no more than 2,175	no more than 210	no more than 220	no more than 10,525	no more than 4,350
Of them BMP's [Armored Personnel Vehicles] and combat vehicles with heavy weapons	no more than 135	no more than 135	no more than 1,590	no more than 130	no more than 135	no more than 7,030	no more than 3,095
Including combat vehicles with heavy weapons	no more than 11	no more than 11	no more than 130	no more than 10	no more than 11	no more than 574	no more than 253
Artillery	no more than 285	no more than 285	no more than 1,615	no more than 250	no more than 285	no more than 6,415	no more than 4,040
Including in regular units	no more than 285	no more than 285	no more than 1,375	no more than 250	no more than 285	no more than 5,105	no more than 3,240
Combat aircraft	no more than 100	no more than 100	no more than 260	no more than 50	no more than 100	no more than 3,450	no more than 1,090
Strike helicopters	no more than 50	no more than 50	no more than 80	no more than 50	no more than 50	no more than 890	no more than 330

The division of the inheritance of the former USSR is also not proceeding smoothly in the military sphere. Experience is demonstrating that the principle of "to everyone in equal measure" (I have in mind the former union republics) to which the leaders of the CIS member-countries military departments arrived in May 1992 in Tashkent has currently begun to suit few people. There have been increased cases of the seizure of military vehicles and equipment of Russian Army units deployed on the territory of the former union republics. You don't have to go far for an example: military depots in Tbilisi and Akhaltsikh have been seized in that same Georgia. Indeed, the depots have been returned to Transcaucasus Military District but the vehicles and equipment have not. According to district command authorities' data, equipment worth more than one billion rubles has been stolen in the Georgian capital alone.

In its turn, the Georgian side has accused the Russian Ministry of Defense of "arms deliveries to Abkhazia". Russian defense department officials categorically reject such accusations: the army is not transferring arms to either the one or the other side. Russian Federation

Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel-General G. Kondratyev has made that statement more precise: 108 tanks which, in his words, are being used to murder peaceful residents, have already been transferred to Georgia in accordance with the Tashkent Agreement.

There is a similar situation in Moldova: its leaders accuse Russia of the transfer of 14th Army arms to the "unconstitutional troops in Tiraspol". While responding to these accusations, General Kondratyev said that they are all conjecture.

Today we are publishing certain excerpts from the "Protocol on Maximum Levels for the Presence of Arms and Equipment" of the seven former republics of the USSR. These levels take into account the already existing agreements on conventional armed forces in Europe [CFE].

Separate protocols exist on the arms and military vehicles of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, coastal defense, and naval infantry troops. The published table does not take into account the Baltic countries from which the troop withdrawals have begun.

The CIS Unified Armed Forces Press Service provided informational material to the editorial staff.

## FRANCE

### Submarines To Carry Multiple-Warhead Missiles

93ES0446A Paris LE MONDE in French 17 Feb 93 p 12

[Article: "All French Submarines Henceforth To Carry Multiple-Warhead Missiles"]

[Text] Before the end of this week, the strategic missile submarine "Foudroyant" will be in active service with the Strategic Oceanic Force (FOST). Thus, all five of the French submarines in this class will be identically armed, able to launch 16 M-4 sea-to-ground missiles each carrying up to six 150-kiloton thermonuclear warheads, which have seven times the power of the Hiroshima bomb. In the past, each of the submarines, like the "Redoutable" now retired from active service, carried 16 single-warhead M-20s.

Foudroyant has undergone refitting in the last 30 months to enable it to carry M-4s and to modernize its navigation systems to match those on the submarine "Inflexible," the first of the new series. Before week's end, it will join the FOST at Ile-Longue (in the roads at Brest) and the four other submarines ("Terrible," "Indomptable," "Tonnant," and "Inflexible") already armed with the M-4 missile.

According to an official classified report, the missiles cost 14.5 billion French francs [Fr] to develop.

Depending on the month, France keeps two or three of the submarines in this fleet on constant patrol. If the international situation were to deteriorate, it could put a fourth submarine out to sea within 3 days on orders from the president. On a rotating basis, a fifth submarine is kept at the Ile-Longue base for periodic maintenance.

A new-generation submarine, the "Triomphant" class, will be operational by mid-1995. With heavier displacement than its predecessors and engineered to be quieter, it will carry 16 M-45 missiles. These are superior to the M-4s, in part because they carry electronic countermeasures and devices to assist penetration of enemy defenses. The cost of developing and producing the M-45 is estimated at Fr4.2 billion. To replace the Inflexible-class submarines, France plans to deploy four Triomphant-class vessels between 1995 and 2005. In the 21st century, the M-45 missiles are to be replaced in turn by M-5 missiles with a range between 8-9,000 km.


According to the official classified Defense Ministry report, the four Triomphant-class submarines to be put in service by 2005 will cost an estimated Fr81.5 billion, the M-5 missiles Fr38.6 billion.

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